Part-1 : Should the Kaveri flow through New Delhi?

Come summer and the two south-Indian states, Karnataka and Tamilnadu, inevitably start the year's quota of dialog on Kaveri river water sharing and people get soaked in political arguments, water related negotiations and political engineering or the lack of them! This has become a pattern etched in stone, with the two states repeatedly being pushed into the arena by the sheer failure of political machinery on all three sides of the table - the two riparian states and the center.

This year the cry heard in some Karnataka voices is the need for a national (river) water sharing policy stemming from an apparent belief that such a 'national policy' could magically uncoil the tension among riparian states just because a third party, the union government, proclaiming itself to be JUST & EQUAL, when given the funnel, will take in all the water in the rivers and direct them to the riparian states in a fair manner. This is pure fiction, as will be shown in this series.

Regardless of the fairness in this deal between states and the union, these are the things that need to be deeply pondered about:

1. (River) Water sharing between states is a characteristically local problem, limited to the interests of the riparian states and the people within them directly influenced by the river waters. A solution to this had rather not come from outside of the problem domain for those would not really address the problem!
2. The farther removed a government is that is arbitrating river water sharing between states, the little it can do to benefit the riparian states, and the lesser JUST & EQUAL its policies and decisions come across to some of them. 'The reason why this is so often the case is that bureaucrats and technicians base themselves mainly on political considerations external to the region in question: the needs of the local population rarely feature at all' ("Water under threat", p 161). Hence the union govt. which is further removed than the governments of the riparian states is much poorly disposed to do justice to these states. (In fact it is better disposed to favor either of the states over the other!)
3. The adverse impact such remotely-designed policies have on the hydrology of various river basins is considerable and long-lasting. Historical tribunals of such remote origins and their verdicts on river water sharing in India have proven this point amply.

Keen on catching up on this debate? Here're some trivia (along with my interpretation) I thought we'd rather help ourselves with before we dive-in, hoping it'll expose whatever sense exists in this argument (about the consequences of a national river water sharing policy).

1. The preamble to the Indian constitution offers JUSTICE (social, economic and political) and EQUALITY (of status and of opportunity) to the citizens of India.
• Literally interpreting: Among other things. the citizens of this republic are secured social, economic and political JUSTICE. 
• Likewise, the citizens have also been secured their EQUALITY of status and of opportunity in this sovereign democratic republic.
2. Item 56 in the Seventh Schedule of this constitution places regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys under the Union List. 
• This officially strips the riparian states of their otherwise natural political right to regulation and development of the rivers flowing through the respective states. 
• How can political JUSTICE be secured by stripping people of rights to govern and develop themselves?
3. Karnataka and Tamilnadu elect 12 & 18 members respectively to the Rajya Sabha and 28 & 39 members respectively to the Lok Sabha. Hence on every vote in Delhi, there are 17 extra Tamilnadu voices roaring to mute Karnataka voices!
• How can Karnataka's EQUALITY of status ever be secured by such unequal representation at the center?
• How can EQUALITY of opportunity be secured by a denial of states' rights to engage in constructive negotiations, targeted at deriving mutual gains, with neighboring Union members? 
• How can any government, other than the state governments, secure this EQUALITY any better?
4. Article 262 of the same constitution conveniently assumes the center (union govt.) to be the responsible body to arbitrate disputes related to inter-state river water sharing.
• But it has been found on several occasions that the decisions arrived at and tribunals awarded by the center have only provoked the states to plan or execute massive reservoir projects purely driven by hoarding intentions laden with greed & fear. 
• Such greed & fear are syntheses of non-federal siphoning off of responsibilities from the states to the center; a center that is not better disposed than the states themselves to decide on such local matters.
• One instance ("KWDT Report", p 331) of Andhra Pradesh describing river waters flowing into the sea as wastage is a clear indication of how such tribunals have bred greed & fear to dangerous proportions at the state level.
• Not only has this led to hydrological degradation of various river basins, but also led to intra-state conflicts (IWMI Research pub., pp 11-14) unseen till then.
5. Coalition equations at the center lead to biased water sharing tribunal awards announced by the center, thereby further complicating the battle over water jurisdiction.
• With the strength of such a coalition lying in safeguarding interests of its members and ally states, non-ally states, where national parties electorally dominate over little or no local political force, don't get their interests safeguarded equally well. Such non-ally states, usual example being Karnataka, are in a way expected to cooperate and endure pains of severe water deprivation while ally states enjoy unfair water surpluses year over year.
• While ally states, like Tamilnadu, continue to reap water lotteries from such central tribunals, as a compensation, non-ally states, like Karnataka, are lured with political mirages like ministries and other such confectionery. National parties, in turn, insure their electoral dominance in Karnataka this way!
• Hence this biased water distribution, and biased treatment of states in general is mainly attributable to the delegation of those tasks to the center that the states themselves should execute. This non-federal, centralized administrative structure of the union govt. combined with sub-optimal state-focused representation at the center is leading to distress and disharmony in this union of states.