We should have State Constitutions, shouldn't we?

Having one constitution, such as the current one, for the entire Indian nation and not letting States to have their respective constitutions is like taking a set of jigsaw pieces and pressing them to fit within a shape of player's choice! No, the pieces fit in only one way, and that way is only decided by the pieces themselves.

Presence of a Constitution of India (COI) on top of suspended State constitutions is perhaps the root cause for those umpteen amendments India has made to the COI and for the prevalence of dire problems in India's socio-economic landscape. For instance, the number of appendages made to Article 371 - the special status gimmick - displays the finicky and fluid state of vision over national policy. Such piecewise approach to making modifications in COI not only provide a reason for its bulky nature but also explain why and how it has failed to perform its original intended duty in this democracy. The very size of the constitution and the vast demography that it intends to acquire under its purview makes it increasingly untenable given the increasing awareness in people about the sovereign and republic nature of this democracy.

The year 2014 is turning out to be an year for the States to reckon with. Chief Ministers of multiple States - Delhi, AP and, just this afternoon, Bihar - have expressed anguish at the alleged misdeeds committed by the central government against the wishes of people living in their States. These can be directly attributed to a rather convolved Constitution of India that often lands even constitutional experts in moments of introspection and doubt; a doubt that shatters the confidence of people in their nation, and also its large, bulky constitution.

This bulky constitution resembles a big fat balloon with multiple punctures - you just cannot say where it will fly, meaning where this constitution will lead India to cannot be predicted easily. The mirth is higher when you have smaller, yet a more colourful bunch of balloons in your hand than one large punctured balloon in flight. You get the analogy, right?

In another State, Tamilnadu, the CM expresses her desire to free a set of convicts who've been in prison for nearly two decades, but the constitution by some weird combination, which too is figured out after much deliberation among experts, makes her seek the Centre's approval despite the fact that Police is a State subject as per Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India itself! Instead of having the Schedule 7 dictate what the States must govern and what the Centre must (& can), wouldn't it be rather more convenient and more appropriate for the States to have their own constitutions and the COI address subjects left behind unattended by the State constitutions? Wouldn't that be real decentralization and real federalism? Wouldn't that be in line with the real spirit of a democracy where the degree of delegation of governance droops with distance - both physical and representative.

The repercussion of this constitutional arrangement is also felt on the linguistic diversity of India. With regards to language planning and policy, Constitution of India is mired in controversy - controversies based on assumptions that go squarely against the nation's linguistic diversity.

The official language act, for instance, which is a statute law spun off from Articles 343 & 344 of the COI, forbids usage of any Indian language apart from Hindi at the Centre. This is a clear violation of human rights happening right under the aegis of a constitution that lays the political framework of this nation. This violation could have been precluded had the language policy of the nation been a linear summation and intercourse of the language policies of all States.

As the famous quote goes, people of India live in their States, and the Centre really need not have any business directly with the people. With such a natural arrangement of business, it is implied that there is very little need for such an all-encompassing constitution at the Centre whereas the need for such a constitution certainly exists at the State level. Time to write one?

Indian Democracy: The Highness of Lows?

A DEMOCRACY should ensure people don't live at the mercy of a single person. Also, Democracy should be about questioning the contemporary and about being able to shape one's tomorrows oneself. This is equity characteristic of a democracy, isn't it? From the way the Telangana episode is unfolding, that equity appears to be denied, perhaps by means of the constitution itself, and in doing so, the President of India, sitting at the apex of the Indian Democratic Republic, seems unquestionable, till now.

If the President's office, occupied by a person with recorded political loyalty to a party that's in power at Centre, agrees to hand over a State Reorganization bill to the parliament, discounting the State's aspirations, the President is indeed portrayed as unquestionable because the rest of the country can only watch, quite literally though! Because the State and its millions of people are absolutely at the mercy of the President's office and the President's decision in this regard. Can such living in the mercy of a single person be called a democracy?

Something in this episode tells me there's an unwritten assumption in our constitution that people are expected to believe the President is unquestionable, and it is better that way for the nation! It is unfair & even unreal to expect an entire nation to assume that one human being in this nation will alone remain unquestionable, even in matters that directly affect the lives of millions of people spread across vast stretches of land - matching that of some countries in the EU! In fact the celebrated office of the President enjoys more constitutional allowances than a democracy can actually afford. For instance the Presidential Ordinance offers an easy route for a favourable political party in power at the Centre to enforce law without opposition, albeit for a maximum of six months.

While the constitution does provide solutions to overrule an unruly or insane President, it does not equip people with a solution to a problem that could arise out of a hidden nexus between the President and a few parliamentarians, who could use the President's political superiority and immunity of sorts to siphon party gains, and subsequently, individual gains.

Talking about living at the mercy of an individual - applying such observations to the Telangana episode India will come across to anyone as that democracy in which people live with the least number of total people that collectively represent them, yet the highest number of total people that don't represent them but are 'empowered' to express their voice for or against them.

That is perhaps a new high in lows among democracies.

People who have seen democracies in action in other parts of the world may see something fundamentally wrong in this setup. The idea of representation has been infected with a virus at birth - a virus of assumption that the newfound idea of representation would work, an assumption that people, hailing from ages of monarchy, would know how to handle representation and get what they need. This assumption has cost the Indian peoples very dear; it has cost them a constitution that is unable to sustain the nation as well as would be desired. This assumption has pushed people to now question its very sanctity and relevance. It has forced people to have the weirdest representation formula that doesn't work for people, but works to pull more power to the Centre. Its time those questions were asked out in public, even if it were addressed to the President.

(After deciding to post this, #PepperSpray has shrouded Parliament. What else could happen when an entire people's identity is so brutally trampled upon?)

The Legal Fortress around Hindi Imposition

Hindi and English are the lone official languages of the government of Republic India. This means ever since India became a sovereign democratic republic, promising to protect the interests of all its citizens, millions of people of non-Hindi background have been rendered as second grade citizens since their government does not deal in their language(s). This is Hindi Imposition in India summarized in a few lines.

With this kind of bias Government of India (GoI) has shown and even institutionalized towards Hindi language and (thereby) people who speak Hindi, and with the protection this institution has provided to Hindi speakers, it appears that Hindi speaking people are double insulated from adverse forces - being governed by a State government and pampered by the GoI both of which designed to favor Hindi people's rights - while non-Hindi people are left bare and helpless out there, exposed to adverse forces. In various circumstances, this is not a metaphor, but very close to reality indeed.

On the other hand, owing to the lack of protection by this institution, people living in non-Hindi States experience insecurity in their own country, with employment, food provision, primary health and even identity services catered to by the GoI being carried on a channel that only speaks Hindi apart from English. These services are freely assimilated by Hindi speaking people whereas they are indigestible to non-Hindi people of India. Be it in terms of getting their fundamental rights protected or even as far until protecting one's own lineage and having a non-decading population over time, lives of non-Hindi peoples of India are subject to substantial stress thanks to policies framed on unfair interpretations of our constitution, such as seen in The Official Language Act 1963.

Simple, yet tough, majority:
Interestingly, Article 368 of Constitution of India (CoI) rests the power to amend the statute in the hands of the parliament alone, whereas some specific parts of the constitution, including the lists in Schedule 7 and Article 368, cannot be amended without approval from a simple majority of State Legislatures. In the wake of an increased number of States being carved out, passing valid amendments to such sections of the CoI becomes a touch exercise to orchestrate - perhaps an outcome favorable to the central government that would like to retain more power with itself. As though in support of such intentions, Article 3 of the same constitution empowers the central govt to do just that - impede the process of State level opinion formation by fragmenting them. Talk about denial of fundamental rights, huh?

A pragmatic, solution oriented approach to the Hindi Imposition problem will call for amendments to Schedule 7 (the Union, State and the Concurrent lists) and some to the Official Language policy, which incidentally have been in demand since long time across the country. The center though has been successful in evading them or putting them off by means of various available interpretations of the constitution, and its protective and tricky fortress of articles that make it very difficult to achieve these essential amendments that will incorporate real federal features into our democracy.

In the backdrop of this sustained Hindi Imposition in India, it is important to see these pieces of law as blocking vital amendments required to stop this unfair imposition and to make way for equality among people of all Indian languages.

(Related read: Let this September open our eyes!)

Telangana and Tungabhadra: A Call for Democratic Uprising

Across the world, boundaries that decide the shapes of Districts or States or even Countries are usually drawn along lines of people's languages, lines of impenetrable geographical structures like mountains and lines drawn by river courses. An exception we see is in India where these widely accepted natural ways of creating boundaries for States are superseded by various actions of the Central Govt - actions that mostly help to remain victorious in elections and to continue centralizing power in Delhi.

While the first of these two intentions seems obvious enough - to retain power, not evil in itself, the second one dealing with increased centralization of power at the Center, stripping the constituent States of those very powers is certainly evil and goes against the spirit of Federalism and the spirit of Democracy. With this kind of superseding taking place in India it is hard for anyone to imagine that the States are indeed federal units in the union that is called India.

One particular comment heard about nations come to my mind in this context - The United States of America is a destructible union of indestructible States, whereas India is an indestructible union of destructible States. But I feel it is immaterial whether a union or a State is destructible or not as long as the responsibility of division and or creating a union rests in the hands of people living in it. But today there is so much confusion, especially in the minds of Telugu speaking people living in Andhra, that a decision either way is going to be a surprise to all of them! Welcoming in the case of some people and unwelcome in the case of others. But when a decision is taken by the people indeed, there is no possibility of surprises and there is no scope for friction to arise out of such decisions.



(source: mapsofindia.com)

Coming to State borders: In the case of the border near Raichur dividing land into Karnataka and Andhra, two rivers decide the contours of this border - the Tungabhadra and the Krishna. While the Krishna river decides the border towards the north of Raichur district, Tungabhadra decides its southern counterpart. The confluence of these two rivers happens inside Andhra at the Srisailam reservoir, within proposed Telangana. With the creation of Telangana State, remaining portion of current Andhra State will be stripped of its control over the Srisailam reservoir and thereby its vast water reserves and irrigation utility. Going by the mood among Telugus during this State reorganization, the new Andhra State may have to beg Telangana for waters that it once enjoyed by being part of the bigger Andhra State, but also faces the risk of Andhra eventually damming the Tungabhadra river flowing within its boundary before draining into Srisailam reservoir. Of course, in this eventuality, the real suffering is experienced by the river and its constituent life forms that are essential for the health of the river itself. At the same time, the Karnataka State runs the risk of a new dam downstream on the Tungabhadra which could lead to significant changes in the ecology of southern parts of Raichur district along the Tungabhadra. This story finds itself repeating with neighboring districts in Maharashtra in the case of Godavari river, which too, enters Andhra through Telangana before passing through Godavari districts in rest of Andhra.

Going back to State reorganization and the politics around it, it is sad to see such wide and deep impacts the politics of State formation could have. This needs to be opposed constitutionally, and the extreme powers of the Center (accorded by Art 3 of the Indian Constitution) to re-draw State borders and thereby gain higher control over States' administrative affairs needs to be questioned, toned down and powers returned to the State governments, which in turn have to do the due diligence of real public consultations before taking such important decisions.

One For The Master and None For The Little Boy

Today's DNA reports that the Karnataka State Food & Civil supplies minister has decided to write to the Government of India (GoI) seeking restriction on rice exports from the State. Apparently this move has been contemplated in the wake of rising rice prices in the open market, and that "the State has no role in curbing price rise."

We may recall in this context voluntary steps promised by the GoI towards controlling spiraling onion prices, again in the open market. These and many similar instances of government intrusion into a free and open market to regulate prices through lateral exercise of legislative and executive powers present evidence of loose interpretation of governance boundaries or an oppressive attitude towards an open market.

These episodes provide evidence to the fact that governments are exceeding their appointed charter to remain in popularity. But an even more interesting pattern that emerges from such episodes is that all the powers required to suppress free-market forces and regulate market prices seem to have been appropriated by the GoI - the master. The State governments, the little boys, as always, are reduced to mere observatories - which are expected to observe the price rise in local markets and obediently report them to the Center.

The Public Distribution System (PDS) is yet another instrument that portrays the State government as a mere spectator, what with the fickle Central ministry fiddling with the rationing of cooking gas and State governments mutely watching the show unfold.

Another burning matter that surfaces out of this issue is the matter of border and import-export control. If the State governments cannot exert control over what gets exported out from the State and they have to rely on the executive powers of the Center to exert this control, it exposes the sad state of control an Indian State has over its own physical borders. It exposes the mechanism in which the States have been made to bequeath control over their own borders to the Center, making States dependent on a less capable government (GoI) when it comes to protecting itself either from external attacking factors or from leakage of internal stuff through these borders - both against State interests.

These topics are fine examples that help understand the critical loopholes that can exist in a highly centralized governance mechanism. Such holes can only be plugged by proper decentralization of governance and powers. A comprehensively thought over devolution of governing powers is highly overdue in India.

Also read (in Kannada) about other border control issues: ಯಾರ ಗಡಿ ಮತ್ತು ಯಾರ ಪಲಾಯನ?

Of Movie Certification, Dubbing and The Mess Around It

(pic:wikimedia.com)

Amidst a legacy of banning screening of movies with scripts that even tangentially deal with the delicate matter of religion and religious institutions, the State of Tamilnadu and cities of Hyderabad and Benglur have successfully upheld this trend and proceeded to either ban or stop screening of Viswaroopam (a Tamil movie made by Kamal Haasan).

If this episode made one crowd raise dust by alleging this move as cultural terrorism by the Tamilnadu State, another termed it as a murder of art in the cinema form, while yet another demanded the grounds on which a State government can ban screening of a movie that has been certified as appropriate for the Indian audience by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). While interpretations about this being akin to an act of terrorism or a murder of any form of art are open to subjective debate, the argument that a CBFC certification should be enough for a movie of any genre and topic to warrant screening anywhere in India - a country with as diverse movie tastes as its cultural footprint - is nothing but a belittling of the natural variety in the tastes of the movie-goers in this country. It is but a fantasy to assume that one single board, notwithstanding its size, can certify movies as appropriate or inappropriate for an entire country as diverse and populous as India.

If the certifying board, CBFC, found no objectionable content in Viswaroopam why is its maker finding himself in the midst of such a judicial stalemate in his home and neighboring States? Why are people from his own neighborhood not finding his movie appropriate while a certifying board far displaced from his people found it appropriate? If the Viswaroopam episode has anything to offer for the thinkers and legislators in this country, then it must be the fundamental question of the validity of a central body such as the CBFC itself.

In this age of technology that enables movies made in any language to be dubbed and simultaneously released in all other languages of the world in their respective markets, it is surprising that we are still living with a mechanism so obsolete as to certify movies for the entire subcontinent. Film markets such as Karnataka still practise an unwritten ban on entertainment dubbed in Kannada caring little for the same CBFC certification that these dubbed movies may carry with them. The reasons behind such banning could be several, but the CBFC is apparently blind to such concerns, neither is it empathetic of the audience's entertainment aspirations, thereby leading to unhealthy breaches of a free-market and avoidable litigation.

A certifying body much closer to the audience and finely savvy of its aspirations is the need of the hour. Film certification in India today carries little value in the local context and is therefore leading to all types of conflicts related to screening of entertainment content, leading only to the disappointment of the end consumer of such content. Ironically, the real decider of the quality of a movie and if it is certifiable or not - the end consumer - is being kept in darkness thanks to a deadly combination of an obsolete certification process and a delicate social equilibrium. This has to come to an end by drawing the curtains down on a national certification ideology and letting the markets take it bottoms-up.

National Interest: Heads, I migrate; Tails, You're exiled?

Dr Sarojini Mahishi

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India do not provide for equality of opportunity for all citizens based on language, yet if recent media reports are to be relied upon, observations made by a Karnataka High Court division bench after hearing a PIL seeking implementation of Sarojini Mahishi Varadi hint at the courts having misconstrued this minute detail of the said Articles. Reported observations:

English has became a global language. So think practically...Though the state cabinet approved the Mahishi report owing to political reasons, we cannot accept such recommendations and pass orders.

Besides, the report shows the court as having misunderstood the meaning of a PIL and burst out at the petitioner saying it cannot direct the State and that the demands of the petitioner are against national interest:

We cannot direct the state to provide jobs on the basis of language. It is illegal and also against national interest. Only Parliament can do such things (legislate)

Although I'd like to stop writing about the PIL and the court's observations, finding the phrase "against national interest" being used here doesn't let me do so! Which national interest is it against for a State legislative arm to pass a fully fair legislation, one that is even allowed under the Indian constitution? However, it would be tragic if we discovered that the judiciary interpreted the States' legislative action to be against national interest.

In this backdrop it is vital to recall some provisions in the Indian constitution: one that assures every citizen a fundamental right to live and settle anywhere in the country, another set of provisions that provide the central government an easy signature to supersede the governance of any State under Sections 355 & 356.

Agreeably, the former provides a right to move around, but is often misconstrued, even by some media houses, as a right that overrides the host State's duty to ensure that welfare of its original residents is not compromised by such in-migration.

This provision of an unconditional right to settle in any State is so unscientific, especially given the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity juxtaposed to become India, that if people continue to migrate into and out of a few financially promising States how are these States supposed to accommodate their highly dynamic populations and how are they supposed to roll out welfare programs for an ever changing demography, whereas that was not the original intention at the time of carving out linguistic States.

On top of this jeopardy that States are left to deal with, a shortfall of good administration as a fallout of this unforeseen and uncontrolled migration to a State could expose it to this latter provision allowing the Center to supersede its power in spite of being financially promising.

Sandwiched between these two provisions, the State Executives are being reduced to mere stenography centers taking directions from the Center under constant fear of being whipped for not accommodating the in-migrantion and consequent socio-economic aftermath. If that is the state of the executive, the legislature is under suspended animation because of inaction and fear of going against national interest by any of its actions!

All this is not helping build a good democracy from the roots. If States are the fundamental units of this union called India it is pitiable that these very States are reduced to such bad condition where they're mere caretakers of amoeba shaped real estates while the Center is busy converting all national assets into capital and framing laws to retain States in paralysis.

If the Indian union has to succeed, the State Legislatures and the State Executives must be freed up, and the Center must agree to look at the States as peers in running this nation and not subordinates who can be issued directives and whipped when fancied.

The Inclusiveness Story told on The Rapid Indian Railways

THE RECENTLY concluded 57th National Development Council witnessed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noting some of his observations about inclusiveness in the Indian union. Going forward he noted that,

Rapid growth also contributes directly to inclusiveness because it provides greater access to income and employment opportunities. Policies aimed at stimulating growth in agriculture and in medium and small industries, combined with steps to promote education and skill development, will produce a growth process which is inherently more inclusive.

Rapid growth, as noted above, plays a vital role in achieving higher inclusiveness indeed. But the reason growth has to be rapid in order to achieve inclusiveness is that the whole process of inclusiveness, at a larger scale, is all about a race - race towards modernization, towards beating the one ahead of you. However, at an 'India' scale, which is large enough too, the race is towards relative modernization, and a race towards beating the State ahead of yours.

Competition is the essence of this race, and the Indian union has to allow this race to take place between Indian States. It cannot take part in the race as a proxy to the non-performing States, perhaps only to disprove the classical allegation that the the rich States got richer and the poor States got poorer. The central government need only be a neutral arbiter to ensure a fair race for all States, and perhaps protect, within reasonable limit, the interest of our States from out-of-scale competition from beyond the national borders. It is sad however, that the very existence of the Planning Commission and its modus operandi look oriented in such fashion so as to make Government of India (GoI) not only a lone proxy for all non-performing states, but also dictate terms of the race altogether! This is not only driving our States into a wrong race, but also jeopardizing their chances of winning the real race.

Railways Overloaded by being Indian?

There are many parameters that act as enablers for each competitor in this race. Today, most such parameters are either directly or indirectly controlled by the GoI. Take the railways for instance. It is shocking to know that the GoI has only added about 15% of rail lines in the last 62 years after having inherited the rest 85%. Railways, that have triggered rapid growth in many countries worldwide, have failed to do the magic in India, thanks to such a bulky administrative and governance juggernaut it is after being centralized in the hands of the GoI.

A general look at the pace at which railway projects are undertaken in India explains how railways could even be having a degenerative effect on growth. Specifically, this example of a railway line doubling between the cities of Mysore and Bangalore initially slated to take 24 months now remains doubtful of completion even after 42 months, quoting petty operational flaws as reasons:

However, if the state government hands over land in Mandya, Maddur and Srirangapatna, the work of electrification and doubling could be completed within six months, he added.

A perfect case for decentralization - Railways remains an unquestioned union list item and the States feature in the deal only when they have to part with their capital and revenue assets in the national interest of laying 10000 kms of railway lines in 62 long years! If that speaks about the inability of a central government in using railways to rapidly grow a vast diverse nation like India, the disturbing skew in delivery, of electrified rail in this case, between different States of India speaks for states like Karnataka and Gujarat that are begging for more efficient (electrified) mode of railway transport.

In a decentralized state of existence, each state would have paved its desirable set of internal rail network, meetings its own needs of rapid growth and competing at the global level.

Overall, it would be an over simplification of the inclusiveness problem to believe there can be one central authority (call it the Planning Commission) making an inclusiveness plan for entire of India. Development of this country is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving the private and public sectors. Hence, it is important that the central government realizes that a cooperative endeavor cannot be undertaken with a hierarchical master-slave engagement between Central & State governments. The goal of future NDCs had better be to foster a peer relation between the governments and create a decentralized environment for this partnership to achieve rapid growth.

(Previous post in this sequence: Moving the BIMARU under a Shining Skin)

Rape, Crime, Decentralized Democracy & The Sarojini Mahishi Report

Circle of Federalism?

IF CRIME in general and rape cases in particular are on the rise in Delhi & other north Indian regions, the best way to protect women in other states (viz. Karnataka) is to closely monitor and reasonably control migration of people from Delhi & other north Indian regions into other states. Even while not curtailing what is popularly perceived as a fundamental right in India (to be able to migrate and settle anywhere in this country,) this measure will greatly help local authorities to plan development programs within the state, track settlement of migrants in host state and make sure migrants do not resort to unlawful activities. Had this been in place already, we would have had far lesser incidents like this one, this one, or may be this one...

If all the waves created by the media around this story serve as a cue to any government, it is the state government (Govt of Karnataka for instance) and these state governments urgently need to wake up to their real job of protecting their state and the state's interests.

For starters, here's a list of things each state government could do in the interest of common welfare, and prevention of migrant related crimes:

1. Demanding education back into state list of items.
• After all it is education, or the lack of it, that is leading people to commit crimes. 
• Education being in the concurrent list, and with an ill-equipped central government at the helm of education affairs in the entire nation, employment & economic disparities are easy consequences.
• This in turn leads to social disparity driving the social awareness disparity quotient high.
2. Demand decentralization of Railways - one of the major carriers of migrants across this country.
• Although not the reason for migration themselves, in the hands of a central govt. the railways are an easy pawn for interested parties to create vote banks out of potentially migration oriented peoples.
• When decentralized and handed over to state governments, railway policies will be governed by the respective state and its usage for induced, as well as uncontrolled migration will be curtailed.
3. The labour ministry at the center needs to be dissolved or diluted to have lesser jurisdiction and control than now, and lesser control than the states.
• Each state needs to be the ultimate point of control and legislation when it comes to labour laws and settling of labour disputes.
• Owing to this ministry being currently held by the center, the labour laws relating to various industries uphold homogenization across boundaries of labour market, and in process encourage excessive migration across the country.
• Proper installation of and enforcement as per Sarojini Mahishi Report (vote) will limit unnecessary migration of people into its state.

The points go on, and is not limited to the list above. Revolutionary changes such as these are not easy achievements and certainly not feasible achievements for political parties that have conflicting interests within and outside of the state. At political crossroads, a state with weaker political lobby always ends up losing the battle and thereby its interests. The dire need for all states that are part of this union is therefore an urgent up-rise of (regional) political parties that understand democracy and the urgent need to usher in federal forces to save this democracy from internal plunder.

Is Karnataka also being Telanganaad?

Karnataka Districts Map @ 2008
(Courtesy: Karnataka State Election Commission)

The Constitution of India appoints the Parliament with a right by law to edit the boundaries of the states that constitute this union called India. Part I (The Union and its Territory) of this constitution features an Article (Art. 3) stated thus:

3. Parliament may by law—
(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;
(b) increase the area of any State;
(c) diminish the area of any State;
(d) alter the boundaries of any State;
(e) alter the name of any State:
[Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States 1***, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of  that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.]

After re-reading the above Article, a point that intrigues me in hindsight is why did the GoK invite the PoI Mr Pranab to inaugurate the Suvarna Vidhana Soudha built recently in Belgaavi, a district in north Karnataka? Was it a cue to impress upon him to refer to the GoK seeking its opinion about a reorganization of the Karnataka state? Is this some sort of collusion happening between the two otherwise rival national political parties in the country? Have they come to see a common political gain as their 'fortune to be won' at the end of this division? Is Karnataka also being Telanganaad?

(to be continued...)

Sandalwood, you have a Missing Link!

Sandalwood: Missing a key link!

Mr Prakash Belawadi, a renowned name in Kannada cinema and among social think tanks yesterday critiqued a recent Bangalore Mirror article titled The Economics of Dubbing. A critique well done, no doubt. But if this has to help anyone at all, that better be the end consumer of entertainment content in the Kannada Film Market (KFM).

The statistics Mr Belawadi cites is pretty straight, in that the entire Indian film market is soon going to be worth 5 billion USD and that KFI's share in that is fast dwindling. He goes on to quote that -

The Kannada film industry needs to tune in to the new age or be politely requested to drop out.

While his observations are true, the perspective in Mr Belawadi's analysis is limited to the making half in a film ecosystem. KFI, in need for an overhaul, needs to focus on the consuming half and critics such as Mr Belawadi would be better off addressing that perspective. Mr Belawadi notes that -

The average Kannadiga avoids our commercial cinema not because she lacks self-esteem but rather that she has too much of it. It is only because we love our culture so much that we shun our cinema.

but fails to elaborate the subtle need for a consumer of Kannada cinema to not shun Kannada cinema but choose various degrees of participation in the feedback mechanism. The critique misses to mention the urgent need to establish feedback mechanisms in the KFM, which could actually serve a great deal in ensuring the KFI produces what the KFM has been craving for! Outcomes of such mechanisms stand as solid proofs of concept for innovative entertainment business models, like dubbing, and also as attractive presentation of KFI as a profitable destination for investors. Expert analysts and thinkers like Mr Belawadi are expected to advocate proliferation of such market survey engines in the KFM.

Apart from deriving meaning out of what audiences are thinking, such survey systems will also add to the volume of people speaking about Kannada cinema, which is less heard if not muted today. If consumers are shunning commercial Kannada movies, that's a feedback no doubt, but that's not sufficient feedback, especially when some seniors in the industry use a flopped film to blame their audiences! The Kannadiga cine-goer needs to be heard. The cine-goers' demand for better entertainment in their own language must be met, agnostic of its maker. 

With a tough customer around, any industry will correct itself if it wants to remain worthy of business. The contemporary rowdy voices rising repeatedly against a legal market innovation called dubbing (in Kannada) will be forced to face the reality with such surveys and this will pave way for a cleaner KFM and thereby a more profitable KFI. We have to find this missing link, and we need everyone to look for it.

(Related read: The Gumma-nomics of Dubbing)

Part-2: Disturbed River Basins and Central Tribunals

Shortly after the 2007 Kaveri river tribunal verdict was announced in February, the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) came out with a critic of this verdict, a verdict that was much awaited by all three states - Karnataka, Tamilnadu and Kerala. Writing in this critic of the verdict - "Why the Cauvery Award is Flawed," Mr Himanshu Thakkar exposes the three important measures on which this verdict fails - science, efficiency and equity. Interpreting the verdict award as biased, Mr Thakkar writes thus about the sad situation Karnataka is put into:

The Karnataka state officials have given an indication of feeling aggrieved by the Tribunal Award... we can see that indeed Karnataka is the only state that has got less share in water than its share in the catchment of the Cauvery basin. When we add the fact that Karnataka area of Cauvery basin has less groundwater availability, we see that there is some justification [sic] this feeling.

Riding on common man's ignorance about (and indifference towards) rivers and water situation in general, central tribunal verdicts such as the Kaveri tribunal verdict in Feb 2007 seem to conveniently ignore the fundamental principles of hydrology and man's water need patterns, and devise water sharing formulae that only politically strengthen the central coalition.

Declaring that this verdict fails the test of science, SANDRP exposes how the verdict fails to take note of the ground water levels in riparian states while arriving at a water sharing formula. It further describes how this is harmful to each of the riparian states even though the formula, at its outset, might seem beneficial to the politically stronger state! This comment summarizes the concern these states must have about such unscientific water awards:

The Cauvery Award fails on the test of science as it does not consider groundwater availability in the Cauvery basin area while deciding the distribution of only the surface  water among the claimants. Tamil Nadu, being the lower riparian, has significant availability of groundwater, while Karnataka and Kerala, being the upper riparian, have relatively little of it... To allow unrestricted groundwater use and not to include groundwater in calculating water availability and allocation, is unscientific, to put it rather charitably.

Although one cannot directly attribute such unscientific water awards to the center's interference in solving inter-state river water sharing problems, one can certainly find action of coalition forces, at the center, responsible. Such forces compel the central government to ignore common sense in the field of hydrology and arrive at formulae that only strengthen the central coalition, in turn causing slow but steady degradation of priceless river water basins. The continued scant water awards Karnataka has been receiving as opposed to Tamilnadu, the other big Kaveri riparian, have made most areas of Karnataka in the Kaveri basin so deprived of river water for basic human processes that in many urban settlements ground water resources are being abused beyond healthy measures, steadily emptying the already poor ground water levels of Kaveri basin in Karnataka (p 74).

Hence, centralization - delegation of this responsibility to settle inter-state disputes about a vital local resource called water to the center - is surely not benefiting the states in question, but only paving new political ways to steadily destroy water bodies and create poor lifestyles for citizens in these states. There is an urgent need for democracy to surface in its real form in water matters and install a correct methodology to settle water disputes in future. As Mr Thakkar, in his conclusion, remarks:

Indeed, amicable solution of river water disputes is possible only when there is greater democracy in water resources planning and decision making, something that is totally missing today.,

there is an urgent need to educate ourselves about the need to decentralize such important matters and allow states to engage in useful dialog to eventually arrive at a more comprehensive and less deleterious water sharing formulae. It is high time the states realized they're their own awarders and awardees when it comes to river water sharing.

Part-1 : Should the Kaveri flow through New Delhi?

Come summer and the two south-Indian states, Karnataka and Tamilnadu, inevitably start the year's quota of dialog on Kaveri river water sharing and people get soaked in political arguments, water related negotiations and political engineering or the lack of them! This has become a pattern etched in stone, with the two states repeatedly being pushed into the arena by the sheer failure of political machinery on all three sides of the table - the two riparian states and the center.

This year the cry heard in some Karnataka voices is the need for a national (river) water sharing policy stemming from an apparent belief that such a 'national policy' could magically uncoil the tension among riparian states just because a third party, the union government, proclaiming itself to be JUST & EQUAL, when given the funnel, will take in all the water in the rivers and direct them to the riparian states in a fair manner. This is pure fiction, as will be shown in this series.

Regardless of the fairness in this deal between states and the union, these are the things that need to be deeply pondered about:

1. (River) Water sharing between states is a characteristically local problem, limited to the interests of the riparian states and the people within them directly influenced by the river waters. A solution to this had rather not come from outside of the problem domain for those would not really address the problem!
2. The farther removed a government is that is arbitrating river water sharing between states, the little it can do to benefit the riparian states, and the lesser JUST & EQUAL its policies and decisions come across to some of them. 'The reason why this is so often the case is that bureaucrats and technicians base themselves mainly on political considerations external to the region in question: the needs of the local population rarely feature at all' ("Water under threat", p 161). Hence the union govt. which is further removed than the governments of the riparian states is much poorly disposed to do justice to these states. (In fact it is better disposed to favor either of the states over the other!)
3. The adverse impact such remotely-designed policies have on the hydrology of various river basins is considerable and long-lasting. Historical tribunals of such remote origins and their verdicts on river water sharing in India have proven this point amply.

Keen on catching up on this debate? Here're some trivia (along with my interpretation) I thought we'd rather help ourselves with before we dive-in, hoping it'll expose whatever sense exists in this argument (about the consequences of a national river water sharing policy).

1. The preamble to the Indian constitution offers JUSTICE (social, economic and political) and EQUALITY (of status and of opportunity) to the citizens of India.
• Literally interpreting: Among other things. the citizens of this republic are secured social, economic and political JUSTICE. 
• Likewise, the citizens have also been secured their EQUALITY of status and of opportunity in this sovereign democratic republic.
2. Item 56 in the Seventh Schedule of this constitution places regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys under the Union List. 
• This officially strips the riparian states of their otherwise natural political right to regulation and development of the rivers flowing through the respective states. 
• How can political JUSTICE be secured by stripping people of rights to govern and develop themselves?
3. Karnataka and Tamilnadu elect 12 & 18 members respectively to the Rajya Sabha and 28 & 39 members respectively to the Lok Sabha. Hence on every vote in Delhi, there are 17 extra Tamilnadu voices roaring to mute Karnataka voices!
• How can Karnataka's EQUALITY of status ever be secured by such unequal representation at the center?
• How can EQUALITY of opportunity be secured by a denial of states' rights to engage in constructive negotiations, targeted at deriving mutual gains, with neighboring Union members? 
• How can any government, other than the state governments, secure this EQUALITY any better?
4. Article 262 of the same constitution conveniently assumes the center (union govt.) to be the responsible body to arbitrate disputes related to inter-state river water sharing.
• But it has been found on several occasions that the decisions arrived at and tribunals awarded by the center have only provoked the states to plan or execute massive reservoir projects purely driven by hoarding intentions laden with greed & fear. 
• Such greed & fear are syntheses of non-federal siphoning off of responsibilities from the states to the center; a center that is not better disposed than the states themselves to decide on such local matters.
• One instance ("KWDT Report", p 331) of Andhra Pradesh describing river waters flowing into the sea as wastage is a clear indication of how such tribunals have bred greed & fear to dangerous proportions at the state level.
• Not only has this led to hydrological degradation of various river basins, but also led to intra-state conflicts (IWMI Research pub., pp 11-14) unseen till then.
5. Coalition equations at the center lead to biased water sharing tribunal awards announced by the center, thereby further complicating the battle over water jurisdiction.
• With the strength of such a coalition lying in safeguarding interests of its members and ally states, non-ally states, where national parties electorally dominate over little or no local political force, don't get their interests safeguarded equally well. Such non-ally states, usual example being Karnataka, are in a way expected to cooperate and endure pains of severe water deprivation while ally states enjoy unfair water surpluses year over year.
• While ally states, like Tamilnadu, continue to reap water lotteries from such central tribunals, as a compensation, non-ally states, like Karnataka, are lured with political mirages like ministries and other such confectionery. National parties, in turn, insure their electoral dominance in Karnataka this way!
• Hence this biased water distribution, and biased treatment of states in general is mainly attributable to the delegation of those tasks to the center that the states themselves should execute. This non-federal, centralized administrative structure of the union govt. combined with sub-optimal state-focused representation at the center is leading to distress and disharmony in this union of states.